The concrete efficiency of secure computation has been the focus of many recent works. In this work, we present concretely-efficient protocols for secure 3-party computation (3PC) over a ring of integers modulo 2 ℓ tolerating one corruption, both with semi-honest and malicious security. Owing to the fact that computation over ring emulates computation over the real-world system architectures, secure computation over ring has gained momentum of late.
INTRODUCTION
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [10, 33, 60] , the holy grail of secure distributed computing, enables a set of n mutually distrusting parties to perform joint computation on their private inputs, in a way that no coalition of t parties can learn more information than the output (privacy) or affect the true output of the computation (correctness). While MPC, in general, has been a subject of extensive research, the area of MPC with a small number of parties in the honest majority setting [4, 14, 16, 30, 47] has drawn popularity of late mainly due to its efficiency and simplicity. Applications such as statistical and financial data analysis [13] , email-filtering [40] , distributed credential encryption [47] as well as MPC frameworks such as VIFF [32] , Sharemind [12] involve 3 parties. Recent advances in secure machine learning (ML) based on MPC have shown applications with small number of parties [45, 46, 48, 55, 59] . MPC with a small number of parties helps solve MPC over large population as well via server-aided computation, where small number of servers jointly hold the input data of the large population and run an MPC protocol evaluating the desired function.
With motivations galore, the specific problem of three-party computation (3PC) tolerating one corruption has received phenomenal attention of late [2, 4, 14, 18, 30, 35, 43, 47, 51, 54] . Leveraging honest majority, this setting allows to attain stronger security goals such as fairness (corrupt party receives the output only if all honest parties receive output) which are otherwise impossible with a dishonest-majority [20] . In this work, we revisit the concrete efficiency of 3PC and to be specific, the efficiency of the inputdependent computation.
The two typical lines of constructions that the regime of MPC over small population offer are-high-throughput [2-4, 18, 30, 51] and low-latency [14, 16, 34, 35, 47, 54] protocols. Relying on secret sharing mechanisms, the former category requires low communication overhead (bandwidth) and simple computations. Catering to low-latency networks, this category takes a number of communication rounds proportional to the multiplicative depth of the circuit representing the function to be computed. On the other hand, the other category, relying on garbled circuits, requires a constant number of communication rounds and serve better in high-latency networks such as the Internet. The focus of this work is highthroughput 3PC. Almost all high-throughput protocols evaluate a circuit that represents the function f to be computed in a secretshared fashion. Informally, the parties jointly maintain the invariant that for each wire in the circuit, the exact value over that wire is available in a secret-shared fashion among the parties, in a way that the adversary learns no information about the exact value from the shares of the corrupt parties. Upon completion of the circuit evaluation, the parties jointly reconstruct the secret-shared function output. Intuitively, the security holds as no intermediate value is revealed during the computation. The deployed secret-sharing schemes are typically linear, ensuring non-interactive evaluation of the linear gates. The communication is required only for the non-linear (i.e.multiplication) gates in the circuit. The focus then turns on improving the communication overhead per multiplication gate. Recent literature has seen a range of customized linear secret-sharing schemes over a small number of parties, boosting the performance for multiplication gates spectacularly [2, 30, 34] .
In an interesting direction towards improving efficiency, MPC protocols are suggested to be cast in two phases-an offline phase that performs input-independent computation and an online phase that performs fast input-dependent computation utilizing the offline computation [6] . The offline phase runs in advance, generates 'raw material' in a relatively expensive way to yield a blazing-fast online phase. This is very useful in a scenario where a set of parties agreed to perform a specific computation repetitively over a period of time. Popularly referred as offline-online paradigm [6] , there are constructions abound that show effectiveness of this paradigm both theoretically [6] [7] [8] [9] 19] and practically [5, 21, 25, 26, 38, 39, 55] .
In yet another direction to improve practical efficiency, secure computation for arithmetic circuits over rings has gained momentum of late, while traditionally fields have been the default choice. Computation over rings models computation in the real-life computer architectures such as computation over CPU words of size 32 or 64 bits. In 3PC setting, the work of [12] supports arithmetic circuits over arbitrary rings with passive security, while [2] offers active security. The works of [25, 28] improve online communication over arbitrary rings with active security, yet fall back to computation over large prime-order fields in the offline phase. This forces the developer to depend on external libraries for fields (which are 10×-100× slower) compared to the real-world system architectures based on 32-bit and 64-bit rings.
Our Contributions. We follow the offline-online paradigm and propose 3PC constructions over a ring Z 2 ℓ (that includes Boolean ring Z 2 1 ) with the most efficient online phase in concrete terms. Though the focus lies on the online phase, the cost of the offline phase is respected and is kept in check. We present a range of constructions satisfying semi-honest and malicious security. We apply our techniques for secure prediction for a range of prediction functions in the outsourced setting and build a number of constructions tolerating semi-honest and malicious adversary. A common feature that all our constructions exude is that function-dependent communication is needed amongst fewer than three pairs of parties in the online phase, yielding better online performance. We elaborate on our contributions. Secure 3PC. Our 3PC protocol with semi-honest security requires communication of two elements per multiplication during the online phase. The per-party online cost of our protocol is less than one element per multiplication, a property achieved for the first time in the 3PC setting. This improvement comes from the use of a form of linear secret-sharing scheme inspired from the work of [34, 37] that allows offloading the task of one of the parties in the offline phase and requires only two parties to talk to each other in the online phase. This essentially implies that the evaluation of multiplication gates in the online phase requires the presence of just two parties, unlike the previous 3PC protocols [2, 4, 18, 30, 43] that insist all the three parties to be awake throughout the computation. One exception is the case of Chameleon [55] , where two parties perform the online computation with the help of correlated randomness generated by a semi-trusted party in the offline phase. Though the model looks similar in the semi-honest setting, we achieve a stronger security guarantee by allowing the third party to be maliciously corrupted. Moreover, our multiplication protocol in the semi-honest setting requires an online communication of 2 ring elements as opposed to 4 of [55] . We achieve this 2× improvement while maintaining the same offline cost (1 element) of [55] .
For the malicious case, our protocol requires a total communication of four elements per multiplication during the online phase. The state-of-the-art protocol over rings requires nine ring elements per multiplication in the online phase. Lastly, we boost the security of our malicious protocol to achieve fairness without affecting its cost per multiplication. The inflation inflicted is purely for the output gates and to be specific for output reconstruction. The key contribution of the fair protocol lies in constructing a fair reconstruction protocol that ensures a corrupt party receives the output if and only if the honest parties receive. The fair reconstruction does not resort to a broadcast channel and instead rely on a new concept of 'proof of origin' that tackles the confusion a sender can infuse in the absence of broadcast channel by sending different messages to its fellow parties over private channels. In Table 1 , we compare our work with the most relevant works. The communication specifies the number of bits that needs to be communicated per multiplication gate in the amortized sense.
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Offline Online Fair? Secure ML Prediction. The growing influx of data makes ML a promising applied science, touching human life like never before. Its potential can be leveraged to advance areas such as medicine [29] , facial recognition [56] , banking, recommendation services, threat analysis, and authentication technologies. Many technology giants such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Apple are offering cloudbased ML services to their customers both in the form of training platforms that train models on customer data and pre-trained models that can be used for inference, often referred as 'ML as a Service (MLaaS)'. However, these huge promises can only be unleashed when rightful privacy concerns, due to ethical, legal or competitive reasons, can be brought to control via privacy-preserving techniques. This is when privacy-preserving techniques such as MPC meets ML, with the former serving extensively in an effective way both for secure training and prediction [24, 41, 44, 46, 48, 55, 59] .
In this work, we target secure prediction where a model-owner holding the model parameters enables a client to receive a prediction result to its query as per the model, respecting privacy concerns of each other. Following the works of [45, 46, 48, 55, 59] , we envision a server-aided setting where the inputs and computations are outsourced to a set of servers. We consider some of the widely used ML algorithms, namely linear regression and linear support vector machines (SVM) regression for regression task and logistic regression and SVM classification for classification task [11] . We propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison that is an important building block for classification task. We exploit the asymmetry in our secret sharing scheme and forgo expensive primitives such as garbled circuits or parallel prefix adders, which are used in [48] and [46] . As emphasized below, our technique allows attaining a constant round complexity for classification tasks.
In Table 2 , we compare our results with the best-known construction of ABY3 [46] that uses a 3-server setting. As the main focus of ABY3 is training, they develop efficient techniques for fixed-point multiplication in a shared fashion, tackling the overflow issues in the face of repeated multiplications. Such techniques can be avoided for functions inducing circuit of multiplicative depth one. Hence we compare with the version of ABY3 that skips this and present below a consolidated comparison in terms of communication. Following the works in the domain of server-aided prediction, we only count the cost incurred by the servers to compute the output in shared form from the inputs in shared form, ignoring the cost for sharing the inputs and reconstructing the output. In the table 'Reg' denotes regression, 'Class' denotes classification, 'Round' denotes the number of online rounds, ℓ denotes the size of the underlying ring in bits and d denotes the number of features. Notably, our proRef.
Param. Implementation. For 3PC, we implement our protocols over the ring Z 2 32 and compare with the state-of-the-art protocols, namely [4] in the semi-honest setting and [2] in the malicious setting. We use latency (runtime) and online throughput as the parameters for the comparison. The online throughput in LAN setting is computed as the number of AES circuits computed per second in the online phase. As an AES circuit requires more than a second in WAN setting, we take a different measure which is the number of AND gates per second. Our protocols improve over the online throughput of the existing ones by a factor of 1.05× to 1.51× over various settings. For the WAN setting, this improvement translates to computing additional AND gates of the range 1.44 to 4.39 millions per second.
For secure prediction, we implement our work using MNIST [42] dataset where d = 784 and with ℓ = 64 in both LAN and WAN. We observe an improvement of 1.02× to 2.56× over ABY3 [46] , in terms of online throughput, for regression algorithms. For classification algorithms, the improvement ranges from 1.5× to 2.93×.
Open Problems. Our techniques are tailor-made for 3PC with 1 corruption. Extending these techniques to the case of an arbitrary Q (2) adversary structure [57] is left as an open problem.
PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a set of three parties P = {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 }, connected by pair-wise private and authentic channels in a synchronous network. The function f to be computed is expressed as a circuit ckt over a ring Z 2 ℓ , consisting of 2-input addition and multiplication gates. The topology of ckt is assumed to be publicly known. The term D denotes the multiplicative depth of ckt, while I, O, A, M denotes the number of input wires, output wires, addition gates, and multiplication gates respectively in ckt. We use the notation w x to denote a wire w with value x flowing through it. We use g = (w x , w y , w z ) to denote a gate in ckt with left input wire w x , right input wire w y and output wire w z . In our protocols, we divide P into disjoint sets {P 0 } and {P 1 , P 2 }, where P 0 acts as a "distributor" to do the "pre-processing" during the offline phase, which is utilized by the "evaluators" P 1 , P 2 to evaluate ckt during the online phase. We use the superscripts "s" and "m" to distinguish the protocols in the semi-honest and malicious setting respectively. The protocols over the Boolean ring Z 2 1 can be obtained by replacing the arithmetic addition (+) and multiplication (×) with XOR (⊕) and AND (·) respectively. Below, we present the tools needed in our protocols.
Collision Resistant Hash. Consider a hash function family H = K × L → Y. The hash function H is said to be collision resistant if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, given the description of H k where k ∈ R K , there exists a negligible function
Shared Key Setup. To save communication between the parties, a one-time setup that establishes pre-shared random keys for a pseudo-random function (PRF) F is used. A similar setup has been used in the known protocols in the 3PC setting [2, 30, 46] . Here F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} κ → X is a secure PRF, with co-domain X being Z 2 ℓ . The set of keys are: -One key shared between every pair of parties-k 01 , k 02 , k 12 for the parties (P 0 , P 1 ), (P 0 , P 2 ), (P 1 , P 2 ) respectively. -One shared key amongst all the parties-k P .
We model the key setup via a functionality F setup that can be realised using any standard secure MPC protocol.
Sharing Semantics. In this section, we explain two variants of secret sharing that are used in this work. Both the variants operate over arithmetic (Z 2 ℓ ) and Boolean (Z 2 1 ) rings.
[·]-sharing. A value v is said to be [·]-shared among P 1 , P 2 , if P 1 and P 2 respectively holds the shares v 1 and v 2 such that v = v 1 + v 2 . We use [·] P i to denote the [·]-share of P i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
We denote ⟦·⟧-share of the respective parties as
Linearity of the secret sharing schemes. Given the [·]-sharing of x, y ∈ Z 2 ℓ and public constants c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z 2 ℓ , parties can locally
It is easy to see that the linearity extends to ⟦·⟧-sharing as well. The linearity property enables parties to locally perform the operations such as addition and multiplication with a public constant.
OUR 3PC PROTOCOL
We start with our 3PC protocol Π s 3pc in the semi-honest setting, that securely evaluates any arithmetic circuit over Z 2 ℓ for ℓ ≥ 1.
3PC with semi-honest security
Protocol Π s 3pc has three stages-input-sharing, circuit-evaluation and output-reconstruction. During input-sharing stage, each party generates a random ⟦·⟧-sharing of its input. During circuit-evaluation stage, the parties evaluate ckt in a ⟦·⟧-shared fashion. During output-reconstruction stage, the parties reconstruct the ⟦·⟧-shared circuit outputs. All the stages (except output-reconstruction) can be cast in the offline and online phase, where the steps independent of the actual inputs can be executed in the offline phase. At a high level, the [·]-sharing needed behind every ⟦·⟧-shared value in the online phase is precomputed, while the ⟦·⟧-sharing of values themselves are computed in the online phase. We distinguish these steps as Offline and Online steps respectively. We now individually elaborate on each of the stages. Figure 1 ) allows party P i ∈ P, the designated party to give input x ∈ Z 2 ℓ to wire w x , to ⟦·⟧-share its input. In the offline step, parties locally sample λ x,1 and λ x,2 using their shared randomness such that parties P 0 and P i learn the entire λ x . In the online step, P i computes m x using λ x and sends it to the evaluators.
Offline:
-If P i = P 0 , parties P 0 , P j for j ∈ {1, 2} locally sample a random λ x, j ∈ Z 2 ℓ . Moreover, P i sets ⟦x ⟧ P i = (λ x, 1 , λ x, 2 ).
-If P i = P 1 , parties P 0 , P 1 sample a random λ x, 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ while all the parties in P sample a random λ x, 2 ∈ Z 2 ℓ . -If P i = P 2 , parties P 0 , P 2 sample a random λ x, 2 ∈ Z 2 ℓ while all the parties in P sample a random λ x, 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ .
Online: P i computes λ x = λ x, 1 + λ x, 2 and sends m x = x + λ x to every P j for j ∈ {1, 2} who then sets ⟦x ⟧ P j = (m x , λ x, j ).
Circuit-evaluation Stage. Here parties evaluate each gate g in the ckt in the topological order, where they maintain the invariant that given the inputs of g in ⟦·⟧-shared fashion, parties generate a ⟦·⟧-sharing for the output of g. If g is an addition gate (w x , w y , w z ), then this is done locally using the linearity of ⟦·⟧-sharing, as per the protocol Π Add (Figure 2 ).
Online:
, the parties compute ⟦z⟧ by running the protocol Π s Mul ( Figure 3 ). During the offline phase, parties generate λ z for the gate output. In addition, P 0 also [·]-shares the product of the masks of the gate inputs (λ x λ y ), both of which are known to P 0 as a part of ⟦x ⟧ P 0 and ⟦y⟧ P 0 . Online phase is executed by {P 1 , P 2 }, where they locally generate [m z ], followed by reconstructing m z .
-P 0 and P 1 locally sample random λ z, 1 , γ x y, 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ , while P 0 and P 2 locally sample a random λ z, 2 ∈ Z 2 ℓ . -P 0 computes γ x y = λ x λ y and sends γ x y, 2 = γ x y − γ x y, 1 to P 2 .
-P 1 , P 2 mutually exchange their shares and reconstruct m z .
Output-reconstruction Stage. In order to reconstruct the output from ⟦y⟧, we observe that the missing share of party P i , for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, is held by the other two parties. Thus, one among the other two parties can send the missing share to P i , who then computes the output as y = m y − λ y,1 − λ y,2 . We call the resultant protocol as Π s Rec (⟦y⟧, P). Protocol Π s 3pc is presented in Figure 4 .
Pre-processing (Offline Phase):
-Input wires: For j = 1, . . . , I, corresponding to the circuit-input x j , parties execute the offline steps of the instance Π s Sh (P i , x j ).
-For each gate g in the topological order, execute offline steps of the instance Π s
Mul
(w x j , w y j , w z j ) if g is the jth multiplication gate where j ∈ {1, . . . , M} or respectively offline steps of the instance Π Add (w x j , w y j , w z j ) if g is the jth addition gate where j ∈ {1, . . . , A}.
Session: Multiparty Computation CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom
Circuit Evaluation (Online Phase):
-Sharing Circuit-input Values: For j = 1, . . . , I, corresponding to the circuit-input x j , party P i executes the online steps of the instance Π s Sh (P i , x j ), where P i is the party designated to provide x j .
-Gate Evaluation: For each gate g in ckt in the topological order, P 1 , P 2 execute the online steps of the instance Π s
Mul
(w x j , w y j , w z j ) if g is the jth multiplication gate where j ∈ {1, . . . , M} or respectively the online steps of the instance Π Add (w x j , w y j , w z j ) if g is the jth addition gate where j ∈ {1, . . . , A}. -Output Reconstruction: Let ⟦y 1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦y O ⟧ be the shared function outputs. The parties in P reconstruct y j for j = 1, . . . , O by executing Π s Rec (⟦y j ⟧, P). We claim that for every wire in ckt, the parties hold a ⟦·⟧-sharing of the wire value in Π s 3pc . The correctness then follows from the fact that for the circuit-output wires, the corresponding ⟦·⟧-sharing is reconstructed correctly. The claim for circuit-input wires follows from Π s Sh , while for addition gates it follows from the linearity of ⟦·⟧-sharing. Consider a multiplication gate (w x , w y , w z ), evaluated as per Π s
, where m x = x + λ x , m y = y + λ y and γ xy = λ x λ y . We argue that m z as computed in online step of Π s Mul results in xy + λ z and hence at the end of Π s Mul , the parties hold ⟦z⟧. This is because The security is argued as follows. If P 0 is corrupt, then the security follows since P 0 never sees the masked values over the intermediate wires. If one of the evaluators is corrupt, then the security holds since the corrupt evaluator knows only one of the shares of each mask value while the other share is picked at random. The detailed security proof appears in the full version of the paper [17] . 
3PC with malicious security
In this section, we describe our maliciously secure 3PC protocol Π m 3pc that securely evaluates any arithmetic circuit over Z 2 ℓ . Similar to Π s 3pc , protocol Π m 3pc has three stages-input-sharing, circuitevaluation and output-reconstruction.
Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction Stages. We begin with the sharing and reconstruction protocols in the malicious setting, which can readily replace Π s Sh and Π s Rec in Π m 3pc to help obtain maliciously-secure input sharing and output reconstruction stage.
In the malicious setting, we need to ensure that the shares possessed by the honest parties are consistent. By consistent shares, we mean that the common share possessed by the honest parties should be the same. In Π s Sh , the λ-shares will be consistent since they are generated non-interactively. But, if a corrupt P 0 owns x and wants to create an inconsistent ⟦x ⟧-sharing, it can send two different versions of m x to P 1 and P 2 . To detect this inconsistency, P 1 , P 2 exchange H(m x ) and abort if there is a mismatch. For efficiency, the parties can exchange a single hash value for all the input wires where P 0 is the owner and thus the cost reduces to two hash values in the amortized sense. We call the protocol as Π m Sh . For reconstruction, let ⟦y⟧ be a consistent sharing to be reconstructed where ⟦y⟧ P 0 = (λ y,1 , λ y,2 ), ⟦y⟧ P 1 = (m ′ y , λ ′ y,1 ) and ⟦y⟧ P 2 = (m ′′ y , λ ′ y,2 ) (the distinction in the notation is done to differentiate the shares held by each party). Protocol Π m Rec (⟦y⟧, P) ( Figure 5 ) enables each honest party to either output y or ⊥. Again for the sake of efficiency, instead of sending individual hash values, each party can send a single hash value with respect to all the values to be reconstructed, to the designated party. This ensures that the amortized cost of each public reconstruction is 3 ring elements.
-P 0 and P 2 send λ y, 2 and H(λ ′ y, 2 ) respectively to P 1 . -P 0 and P 1 send λ y, 1 and H(λ ′ y, 1 ) respectively to P 2 . -P 1 and P 2 send m ′ y and H(m ′′ y ) respectively to P 0 . P i for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} abort if the received values mismatch. Else P i sets y = m y − λ y, 1 − λ y, 2 . to one that tolerates malicious behaviour. We start with the observation that Π s Mul suffers in two mutually-exclusive ways in the face of one malicious corruption, each under a different corruption scenario. When P 0 is corrupt, the only possible violation in Π s Mul comes in the form of sharing γ xy λ x λ y during the offline phase. When P 1 (or P 2 ) is corrupt, the violation occurs when a wrong share of m z is handed over to the fellow honest evaluator during the online phase, causing reconstruction of a wrong m z . While the attacks are quite distinct in nature, our novel construction solves both the issues at the same time via checking product-relation of a single ⟦·⟧-shared triple. We start with the technique to tackle a corrupt evaluator (P 1 or P 2 ) during the online phase. To identify if an incorrect m z is reconstructed by an honest evaluator, say P 1 , it can seek the help of P 0 as follows: P 1 can send m x , m y to P 0 , who can then compute m z , as P 0 already has knowledge of λ x , λ y and λ z from the offline phase and send back to P 1 . Note that sending m x , m y in clear to P 0 breaks privacy of the scheme and hence P 1 sends padded version of the same to P 0 , namely m ⋆ x = m x + δ x and m ⋆ y = m y + δ y . P 0 then computes m ⋆ z = −m ⋆ x λ y − m ⋆for an honest P 2 follows similarly. Now we describe how to enable P 0 obtain χ = δ x λ y + δ y λ x − γ xy . First of all, note that revealing χ in clear to P 0 leads to breach of privacy. Because, P 0 knows λ x , λ y , γ xy from the offline phase and it receives m x + δ x , m y + δ y during the online phase. With this information, P 0 can deduce a relation between m x and m y . Hence, we tweak the value of χ to δ x λ y + δ y λ x + δ z − γ xy incorporating a random mask δ z . To generate χ , in the offline phase, parties P 1 , P 2 locally sample random elements δ x , δ y , δ z ∈ Z 2 ℓ , compute a [·]-sharing of χ and sends the shares to P 0 . Let [χ ] P i = χ i for i ∈ {1, 2}. P 0 locally adds the [·]-shares and obtains χ . In the above step, a corrupt evaluator can introduce an error while computing the [·]-share of χ , affecting the correctness of the protocol. Thus, it is crucial to ensure the correctness of χ computed by P 0 .
To summarize, we now have two issues to tackle in the offline phase-(i) as we pointed out earlier, during the offline phase, a corrupt P 0 can incorrectly share γ xy ; (ii) a corrupt evaluator can send a wrong [·]-share of χ to P 0 . Towards tackling these, once P 0 obtains the value χ , parties locally compute ⟦·⟧-shares of values a = δ x − λ x , b = δ y − λ y and c = (δ z + δ x δ y ) − χ as follows:
Now (⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧) is a multiplication triple (c = ab) if and only if P 0 shares γ xy correctly (when it is corrupt) and P 0 reconstructs χ correctly (when one of the evaluators is corrupt). This is because,
We next recall the two standard components needed to check the validity of a multiplication triple-i) a tool for generating ⟦·⟧-shared random multiplication triple and ii) a technique to check securely the product relation of a ⟦·⟧-shared triple, given a valid ⟦·⟧-shared multiplication triple (often referred to as sacrificing technique). With a lot of constructions specifically available for the former one [2, 30] , we choose to model it as an ideal functionality F trip and use it for our purpose without going into the details. For the latter component, we quickly recall the known protocol.
F trip , by now a standard functionality [2, 30] , allows to generate a set of ⟦·⟧-sharing of multiplication triples over P, each of which, say (d, e, f) satisfies the following-i) d, e and f are random and private and ii) f = de. We use Π trip to denote the instantiation of this functionality.
-Parties locally compute ⟦ρ ⟧ = ⟦a⟧ − ⟦d⟧ and ⟦σ ⟧ = ⟦b⟧ − ⟦e⟧.
-Parties reconstruct ρ and σ by executing Π m Rec (⟦ρ ⟧, P) and Π m Rec (⟦σ ⟧, P) respectively. -Parties locally compute ⟦τ ⟧ = ⟦c⟧ − ⟦f⟧ − σ ⟦d⟧ − ρ ⟦e⟧ − σ ρ. Protocol Π prc [19, 30] (Figure 6 ) takes a pair of ⟦·⟧-shared random and private triples as input, say (a, b, c) and (d, e, f), over Z 2 ℓ , verifies if the former is a multiplication triple or not and nothing beyond, given the latter is a valid multiplication triple.
By exploiting the definition of ⟦·⟧-sharing, we reduce the cost of Π prc to just 2, instead of 3, instances of Π m Rec , in an amortized sense. Recall that the goal of the third invocation of Π m Rec inside Π prc is to reconstruct ⟦τ ⟧ = (m τ
Offline :
-Parties P 0 , P 1 locally sample random λ z, 1 , γ x y, 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ , while P 0 , P 2 locally sample a random λ z, 2 . P 0 locally computes γ x y = λ x λ y and sends γ xy, 2 = γ x y − γ xy, 1 to P 2 . -Parties execute Π trip to generate a triple (⟦d⟧, ⟦e⟧, ⟦f⟧).
-Parties P 1 , P 2 locally sample random δ x , δ y , δ z ∈ Z 2 ℓ and compute [δ z ] non-interactively.
[γ x y ] P i and sends [χ ] P i to P 0 , who computes χ . -Parties locally compute the ⟦ ·⟧-shares of the values a = δ x − λ x , b = δ y − λ y and c = (δ z + δ x δ y ) − χ , as described in the text.
-Parties execute Π prc on (⟦a⟧, ⟦b⟧, ⟦c⟧) and (⟦d⟧, ⟦e⟧, ⟦f⟧).
Online :
. P 1 , P 2 mutually exchange their shares and reconstruct m z . -P 1 sends m ⋆ x = m x + δ x , m ⋆ y = m y + δ y to P 0 , while P 2 sends H(m ⋆ x | |m ⋆ y ) to P 0 . P 0 outputs ⊥, if the received values are inconsistent.
-P 0 computes m ⋆ z = −m ⋆ x λ y − m ⋆ y λ x + λ z + 2γ x y + χ and sends H(m ⋆ z ) to both P 1 and P 2 . to the evaluators at the end of the circuit-evaluation. The former step can be coupled with the communication of (m ⋆ x , m ⋆ y ) by P 1 to P 0 . Party P 1 communicating to P 0 attributes to the increase in the communication cost per multiplication gate in the malicious setting, compared to the semi-honest setting. On the positive note, coupling the above communication for all the multiplication gates together results in a couple of rounds overhead compared to the semi-honest protocol. As a consequence, the latency of the maliciously-secure protocol remains as good as the protocol in the semi-honest setting.
For correctness, first consider the case when P 0 is corrupt and [·]-shares γ xy λ x λ y during offline step. Let γ xy = λ x λ y + ∆ Session: Multiparty Computation CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom where ∆ is the error introduced by P 0 . Now,
and thus (a, b, c) is not a multiplication triple. Hence, honest evaluators output ⊥ during Π prc . Second, we consider the case when one of the evaluators, say P 1 , sends χ 1 + ∆ to P 0 who reconstructs χ ′ = χ + ∆. Then, the value
and hence (a, b, c) is not a multiplication triple. Thus, similar to the previous case, honest parties output ⊥ during Π prc . Lastly, we consider the case, when one of the evaluators, say P 1 , is corrupt and during online step sends [m z ] P 1 +∆ for some non-zero ∆ during the reconstruction, so that P 2 reconstructs m z + ∆, instead of m z . In this case, the honest P 0 would have χ = δ x λ y +δ y λ x +δ z −γ xy from offline step. Moreover, during online step, P 0 correctly learns m ⋆ x = m x + δ x and m ⋆ y = m y + δ y . Furthermore, γ xy = λ x λ y holds. It then follows that m ⋆ z received by P 2 from P 0 will be different from m z + ∆ − m x m y +δ z locally computed by P 2 and hence P 2 will output ⊥. The informal privacy argument of Π m Mul is as follows. We first consider the case when P 0 is corrupt, where ⟦x ⟧, ⟦y⟧ and ⟦z⟧ are defined by the shares of P 1 , P 2 . The privacy for this case follows from the fact that P 0 does not learn anything about m x , m y and m z , neither during the offline step, nor during the online step. Clearly, the communication between P 0 and P 1 , P 2 during offline step is independent of m x , m y and m z . Moreover, the value χ reveals nothing about δ x and δ x since it is padded with a random δ z . During the online step, P 0 learns m ⋆ x and m ⋆ y , which reveals nothing about m x , m y , as δ x and δ y remains random and private for P 0 . We next consider the case when one of the evaluators, say P 1 is corrupt. The privacy for this case follows from the fact that λ x , λ y , λ z and γ xy remains private from the view point of P 1 . On the other hand, no additional information is revealed from m ⋆ z during the online step, as adversary will already know that m ⋆ z = m z − m x m y + δ z . We now state the communication complexity of protocol Π m 3pc below. For the proofs, see [17] . Achieving Fairness. We boost the security of Π m 3pc from abort to fairness via a fair reconstruction protocol Π fRec that substitutes Π m Rec for the reconstruction of the circuit outputs. To fairly reconstruct ⟦y⟧, the pair {P 0 , P 1 } commits their common share λ y,1 to P 2 and likewise the pair P 0 , P 2 commits their common share λ y,2 to P 1 in the offline phase. In the online phase, the evaluator pair {P 1 , P 2 } commits their common information m y to P 0 . In all the three cases, shared random (PRF) keys are used to derive the randomness for preparing the commitments. As a result, each pair should prepare an identical commitment ideally. The recipient in each case can abort when the received commitments do not match. If no abort happens, P 0 signals P 1 and P 2 to start opening the commitments which will help the parties to get their missing share and reconstruct the output. As there is at least one honest party in each pair of (P 0 , P 1 ), (P 0 , P 2 ) and (P 1 , P 2 ), the opened value of the honest party from each pair is used for reconstructing y. Lastly, if the protocol aborts before, then none receive the output maintaining fairness.
Offline:
-Parties P 0 , P 1 locally sample a random r 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ , prepare and send commitments of λ y, 1 and r 1 to P 2 . Similarly, parties P 0 , P 2 sample a random r 2 and send commitments of λ y, 2 and r 2 to P 1 The randomness needed for both commitments are sampled from the PRF key-setup. -P 1 (resp. P 2 ) aborts if the received commitments mismatch.
Online:
-P 1 , P 2 compute a commitment of m y using randomness sampled from their PRF key-setup and send it to P 0 . -If the commitments do not match, P 0 sends (abort, o 1 ) to P 2 , while it sends (abort, o 2 ) to P 1 and aborts, where o i denotes the opening information for the commitment of r i . Else P 0 sends continue to both P 1 and P 2 .
-P 1 , P 2 exchange the messages received from P 0 .
-P 1 aborts if it receives either (i) (abort, o 2 ) from P 0 and o 2 opens the commitment of r 2 or (ii) (abort, o 1 ) from P 2 and o 1 is the correct opening information of r 1 . The case for P 2 is similar to that of P 1 -If no abort happens, parties obtain their missing share of a as follows: -P 0 , P 1 open λ y, 1 towards P 2 .
-P 0 , P 2 open λ y, 2 towards P 1 .
-P 1 , P 2 open m y towards P 0 .
-Parties reconstruct the value y using missing share that matches with the agreed upon commitment. A very subtle issue arises in the above protocol in the absence of a broadcast channel. A corrupt P 0 can send distinct signals to P 1 and P 2 (abort to one and continue to the other), breaching unanimity in the end. To settle this, we make the pair {P 0 , P 1 } to commit a value r 1 chosen from their common random source to P 2 and likewise the pair P 0 , P 2 to commit a common value r 2 to P 1 in the offline phase. In the online phase, when P 0 signals abort to P 1 , it sends the opening of r 2 along. Similarly, when P 0 signals abort to P 2 , it sends the opening of r 1 along. Now an evaluator, say P 1 on receiving the abort can convince P 2 that it has indeed received abort from P 0 , using r 2 as the proof of origin for the abort message. Because the only way P 1 can secure r 2 is via P 0 . Put differently, a corrupt P 1 cannot simply claim that it received abort from P 0 , while P 0 is really instructed to continue. A single pair of (r 1 , r 2 ) can be used as a proof of origin for multiple instances of reconstruction running in parallel. Protocol Π fRec (⟦y⟧, P) is formally presented in Figure 8 .
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The commitment can be implemented via a hash function H () e.g. (c, o) = (H (x ||r ), x ||r ) = Com(x; r ), whose security can be proved in the random-oracle model (ROM). In the complexity of Π fRec stated below, we do not include the cost of committing and opening r 1 , r 2 , as it will get amortized away over many instances. Lemma 3.3. Protocol Π fRec requires one round and an amortized communication of 4 commitments in the offline phase. Π fRec requires four rounds and an amortized communication of at most 2 commitments and 6 opening of commitments in the online phase.
PRIVACY PRESERVING MACHINE LEARNING
We now apply our 3PC techniques to the regime of ML prediction for a range of prediction functions-linear regression, logistic regression, linear SVM classification and linear SVM regression.
The Model. A model-owner M, holding a vector of trained model parameters, would like to offer ML prediction service to a client C holding a query vector as per certain prediction function. In the server-aided setting, M and C outsource their respective inputs in shared fashion to three untrusted but non-colluding servers {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 } who perform the computation in shared fashion via techniques developed for our 3PC protocols and reconstruct the output to the client alone. The client learns the output and nothing beyond. We assume a computationally bounded adversary A, who can corrupt at most one of the servers {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 } and one of {M, C} in either semi-honest or malicious fashion. The security against an A corrupting parties in both sets {P 0 , P 1 , P 2 } and {M, C} semihonestly and likewise maliciously reduces to the semi-honest and respectively malicious security of our 3PC protocols. Adversarial machine learning [52, 53, 58] that includes attacks launched by a client to learn the model using its outputs, lies outside the scope of this work. Following the existing literature on server-aided secure ML [31, 36, 49 , 50], we do not count the cost of M and C making their inputs available in secret-shared form amongst the servers and the cost of reconstructing the output to the client. We assume that the inputs are available to the servers in a secret-shared form and focus on efficient computation of a prediction function on the shared inputs to obtain shared outputs. = (a 1 , . . . , a d ) is said to be ⟦·⟧-shared, denoted as ⟦⃗ a⟧, if each a i is ⟦·⟧-shared. We use − → λ a and − − → m a to denote the vector of masks and vector of masked values respectively, corresponding to ⟦⃗ a⟧. Finally, we note that the linearity of [·] and ⟦·⟧-sharings hold even over vectors.
Notations. For a vector ⃗ a, a i denotes its
Fixed Point Arithmetic. We represent decimal values as ℓ-bit numbers in signed 2's complement representation with the most significant bit representing the sign bit and x least significant bits representing the fractional part. For our purpose, we choose ℓ = 64 and x = 13, keeping i = ℓ − x − 1 = 50 bits for the integer part. We then treat these ℓ-bit strings as elements of Z 2 ℓ . A product of two numbers from this domain would lead to expanding x to 26 and yet leaving 37 bits for the integer part which keeps the accuracy unaffected. As the prediction functions of our concern require multiplication of depth one, the prediction function output values have the above format. Noticeably, since SecureML [48] and ABY3 [46] need to do multiplication in sequence multiple times for the task of training, they propose a new method of truncation to maintain a representation invariant across the sequential products. This is necessary to keep accuracy in check in their works.
Protocols for ML
Secure Dot Product. Given the ⟦·⟧-shares of d element vectors ⃗ p and ⃗ q, the goal of a secure dot-product is to compute ⟦·⟧-sharing of ⃗ p ⊙ ⃗ q. Using Π Mul naively to compute the product of each component would require a communication complexity that is linearly dependent on d in both the offline and online phase. In the semihonest setting, following the literature [15, 22, 27, 46, 55] , we make the communication of Π dp independent of d as follows: during the offline phase,
During the online phase, instead of reconstructing each m p i q i separately to compute m u where u = ⃗ p ⊙ ⃗ q, the evaluators P 1 , P 2 locally compute [m u ] and then reconstruct m u . We call the resultant protocol as Π s dp ( Figure 9 ).
Offline : P 0 , P 1 sample random λ u, 1 , γ pq, 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ , while P 0 , P 2 sample random λ u, 2 ∈ Z 2 ℓ . P 0 locally computes γ pq = − → λ p ⊙ − → λ q , sets γ pq, 2 = γ pq − γ pq, 1 and sends γ pq, 2 to P 2 .
-P 1 and P 2 mutually exchange their share of [m u ] to reconstruct m u .
Figure 9:
Protocol Π s dp Due to the extra checks we introduce against a malicious adversary in our multiplication protocol, the optimization done above for the semi-honest protocol are not applicable. Hence, we resort to d invocations of protocol Π m Mul . Invoking Theorem 3.2, our protocol for dot product then needs to communicate 21d ring elements in the offline phase. However, we improve the online cost from 4d (as per Theorem 3.2) to 2d + 2 as follows. During the online phase, P 1 sends in parallel m ⋆ p i , m ⋆ q i values for i ∈ {1, . . . , d } to P 0 , while P 2 sends the corresponding hash to P 0 . Now instead of sending m ⋆ p i q i for each p i q i , P 0 can "combine" all the m ⋆ p i q i values and send a single m ⋆ u value to P 1 , P 2 for verification. In a more detail, P 0 computes m ⋆ u = d j=1 m ⋆ u j and sends a hash of the same to P 1 , P 2 , who can then cross check with a hash of m u − d j=1 (m p j m q j − δ u j ). We call the resultant protocol as Π m dp . The communication complexity of the dot product protocols are given below. Lemma 4.1. Π s dp requires a communication of one and two ring elements during the offline and online step respectively. Π m dp requires a communication of 21d and 2d + 2 ring elements during the offline and online step respectively. Secure Comparison. Securely comparing two values is one of the major hurdles in realizing efficient secure ML algorithms. Given arithmetic sharings ⟦u⟧, ⟦v⟧, parties wish to check whether u < v, which is equivalent to checking if a < 0, where a = u−v. In the fixedpoint arithmetic representation, this task can be accomplished by checking the msb(a). Thus the goal reduces to generating Booleanshares of msb(a) given the arithmetic-sharing ⟦a⟧. Here, we exploit the asymmetry in our secret sharing scheme and forgo expensive primitives such as garbled circuits or parallel prefix adders, which are used in SecureML [48] and ABY3 [46] .
Offline: P 1 , P 2 together sample a random r, r ′ ∈ Z 2 ℓ and set p = msb(r).
Parties non-interactively generate Boolean shares of p as ⟦p⟧ B P 0 = (0, 0), ⟦p⟧ P 1 = (p, 0) and ⟦p⟧ P 2 = (p, 0).
to P 0 , who adds them to obtain ra. -P 0 executes Π s Sh (P 0 , q) over Z 2 1 to generate ⟦q⟧ B where q = msb(ra). We observe that in the signed 2's complement representation, if we multiply two values, then the sign of the product is the product of the signs of the individual multiplicands. That is, if a value a is multiplied with r, then sign(a · r) = sign(a) ⊕ sign(r). On a high level, the semi-honest comparison protocol ( Figure 10 ) proceeds as follows: P 1 , P 2 reconstruct ra towards P 0 where a is the value we need the sign of, and r is a random value sampled by P 1 , P 2 together. P 0 in turn shares the sign of ra over Z 2 1 . Parties retrieve the sign of a by XORing the sign of ra with the sign of r. For the sake of clarity, we use the superscript B to denote Boolean shares.
Offline: P 1 , P 2 sample a random r 1 ∈ Z 2 ℓ and set p 1 = msb(r 1 ) while P 0 , P 2 sample a random r 2 and set p 2 = msb(r 2 ).
-Parties non-interactively generate ⟦ ·⟧-shares of r 1 as ⟦r 1 ⟧ P 0 = (0, 0), ⟦r 1 ⟧ P 1 = (r 1 , 0) and ⟦r 1 ⟧ P 2 = (r 1 , 0). -Parties non-interactively generate ⟦ ·⟧-shares of r 2 as ⟦r 2 ⟧ P 0 = (0, −r 2 ), ⟦r 2 ⟧ P 1 = (0, 0) and ⟦r 2 ⟧ P 2 = (0, −r 2 ). -Parties execute Π m Mul on ⟦r⟧ and ⟦a⟧ to generate ⟦ra⟧ followed by enabling P 0 , P 1 to reconstruct ra (this is done by slightly modifying the protocol Π m Rec ). -P 1 executes Π m Sh (P 1 , q) over Z 2 1 to generate ⟦q⟧ B where q = msb(ra).
In parallel, P 0 locally computes m q and sends H(m q ) to P 2 , who abort if the value mismatches with the hash of the value m q received from P 1 as part of Π m Sh (P 1 , q). For the malicious case, we cannot rely solely on P 0 to generate ⟦msb(ra)⟧ B . The modified protocol appears in Figure 11 , whose security proof appears in [17] . The communication and round complexity are given below, whose proof will be available in [17] . Lemma 4.2. Π s BitExt requires no communication during the offline step, and two rounds and communication of 2ℓ + 2 bits during the online step. Π m BitExt requires four rounds and an amortized communication of 46ℓ bits during the offline step, and three rounds and an amortized communication of 6ℓ + 1 bits during the online step.
ML Prediction Functions. We consider four prediction functions -two from regression category with a real or continuous value as the output and two from classification type with a bit as the output. The inputs to the functions are vectors of decimal values. We provide a high-level overview of the functions below and more details can be found in [45, 46, 48] .
• Linear Regression: M owns a d-dimensional model parameter ⃗ w and a bias b, while C holds a d-dimensional query vector ⃗ z.
The inputs of M and C are similar to linear regression. M needs to provide an additional input t in the range
, where sign(·) returns the sign bit of its argument. Since the values are represented in 2's complement representation, sign() returns the most significant bit (MSB) of its argument.
• SVM Classification: The inputs of M and C remain the same as in SVM regression. But the output of C changes to f svmc ({α j ,
IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARKING
In this section, we provide empirical results for our 3PC and secure prediction protocols. We start with the description of the setup environment-software, hardware, and network.
Network & Hardware Details. We have experimented both in a LAN (local) and a WAN (cloud) setting. In the LAN setting, our machines (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ) are equipped with Intel Core i7-7790 CPU with 3.6 GHz processor speed and 32 GB RAM. In the WAN setting, we use Microsoft Azure Cloud Services with machines located in South East Asia (P 0 ), North Europe (P 1 ) and North Central US (P 2 ). We used Standard E4s v3 instances, where machines are equipped with 32 GB RAM and 4 vcpus. Every pair of parties are connected by bidirectional communication channels (TCP/IP connection) in both the LAN and WAN setting, facilitating simultaneous data exchange between them. We consider a LAN with 1Gbps and a WAN with 25Mbps channel bandwidth. We measured the average round-trip time (rtt) for communicating 1 KB of data between P 0 -P 1 , P 1 -P 2 and P 0 -P 2 in both the setting. In the LAN setting, the average rtt turned out to be 0.47ms. In the WAN setting, the rtt between P 0 -P 1 , P 1 -P 2 and P 0 -P 2 are 201.928ms, 81.736ms and 229.792ms respectively. Software Details. Our code follows the standards of C++11. We implemented our protocols in both semi-honest and malicious setting, using ENCRYPTO library [23] . We used SHA-256 to instantiate the hash function. We use multi-threading to facilitate efficient computation and communication among the parties. For benchmarking, we use the AES-128 [1] circuit. For ML prediction, since the code for ABY3 [46] was not available, we implemented their protocols in our framework for benchmarking. We run each experiment 20 times and report the average for our measurements.
Parameters for Comparison. All our constructions are compared against their closest competitors which are implemented in our environment for a fair comparison. We consider five parameters for comparison-latency (calculated as the maximum of the runtime of the parties or servers in case of secure prediction) in both LAN and WAN, total communication complexity and throughput of the online phase over LAN and WAN. For 3PC over LAN, the throughput is calculated as the number of AES circuits that can be computed per second. As an AES evaluation takes more than a second in WAN, we change the notion of throughput in WAN to the number of AND gates that can be computed per second. For the case of secure prediction, throughput is taken as the number of queries that can be processed per second in LAN and per minute in WAN. For simplicity, we use online throughput to denote the throughput of the online phase. The discrepancy across the benchmarking parameters for LAN and WAN comes from the difference in rtt (order of microseconds for LAN and milliseconds for WAN). Table 3 , we compare our 3PCs over the Boolean ring (Z 2 ) both in semi-honest and malicious setting with their closest competitors [4] and [2] respectively in terms of latency and communication. In the semi-honest setting, we observe that the online latency for [4] and our protocol remain same over LAN. This is because both protocols require the same number of rounds of interaction during the online phase. Over WAN, our protocol outperforms [4] in terms of online latency and this comes from the asymmetry in the rtt among the parties. In detail, our protocol has only one pair amongst the three pairs of parties to communicate for most of the rounds in the online phase. Thus, when compared with existing protocols, we have an additional privilege where we can assign the roles of the parties effectively across the machines so that the pair of parties having the most communication in the online phase is assigned the lowest rtt. As a result, the time taken by a single round of communication comes down to the minimum of the rtts among all the pairs, as opposed to the maximum. Thus we achieve a gain of (maximum rtt)/(minimum rtt) in time per round of communication, compared to the existing protocols.
Experimental Results

Results for 3PC. In
In Figure 12 , we compare the online latency of our protocols with their competitors, for a varying multiplicative depth (that dictates the round complexity). The same plot applies to both the semihonest setting and malicious setting, as they differ by a single round and its impact vanishes with the growing number of rounds. We observe that the impact of rtt becomes more visible with the increase in the number of online rounds, leading to improved efficiency.
Next, we compare the online throughput for 3PC over both LAN (#AES/sec) and WAN (#AND/sec) setting and the results appear in Table 4 ('M' denotes million and 'Improv.' denotes improvement). Notably, our protocol's online throughput is clearly better than that of its competitors. This is mainly because of the improvement in online communication, though the asymmetry in our protocol has a contribution in it. In the semi-honest setting, our protocol is able to effectively push around 33% of the total communication to the offline phase, resulting in an improved online phase. In the malicious setting, our protocol reduces online communication by a factor of 2.25× with an increase in the offline phase by a factor of 1.75×, when compared with the state-of-the-art protocols.
Results for Secure Prediction.
We benchmark our ML protocols that cover regression functions (linear and SVM) and classification functions (logistic and SVM) over a ring Z 2 64 . We report our performance for MNIST database [42] that has d = 784 features and compare our results with ABY3 [46] (with the removal of extra tools as mentioned in the introduction). The comparison of latency and communication appears below.
Regression. For regression, the servers compute ⟦·⟧-shares of the function ⃗ w ⊙ ⃗ z + b, given the ⟦·⟧-shares of ⟦ ⃗ w⟧, ⟦⃗ z⟧ and ⟦b⟧. This is computed by parties executing secure dot-product on ⟦ ⃗ w⟧ and ⟦⃗ z⟧, followed by locally adding the result with ⟦·⟧-shares of b. Here we provide benchmarking for two regression algorithms, namely Linear Regression and Linear SVM Regression. Though the aforementioned algorithms serve a different purpose, we observe that their underlying computation is the same from the viewpoint of the servers, apart from the values ⃗ w,⃗ z and b being different as mentioned in Section 4.1. Thus we provide a single benchmark, capturing both the algorithms and the results appear in Table 5 In the semi-honest setting, similar online latency for both protocols over LAN can be justified by the similar rtt among parties. Over WAN, the asymmetry in the rtt among the parties adds benefit to our protocol. In the malicious setting, the result is further improved, since we require one less round when compared with ABY3 in the online phase. In Table Table 6 , we provide an online throughput comparison of our regression protocols over LAN (queries/sec) and WAN (queries/min) setting. Table 6 : Online Throughput of Regression Protocols
We observe that the throughput was further boosted in the malicious setting because of our efficient dot-product protocol (Section 4.1) with which we could improve the online communication by a factor of 4.5× when compared to ABY3.
In Figure 13 , we present a comparison of online throughput (#queries/sec for LAN and #queries/min for WAN) against the number of features in the malicious setting, for a number of features varying from 500 to 2500. Since the online communication cost is independent of the feature size in the semi-honest setting, we omit to plot the same. The plot clearly shows that our protocol for regression outperforms ABY3 in terms of online throughput. The reduction in throughput with the increase in feature size for both ours as well as ABY3's can be explained with the increase in communication for higher feature sizes.
Classification. For classification, the servers compute ⟦·⟧ B -shares of the function sign(⃗ w⊙⃗ z+b), given the ⟦·⟧-shares of ⟦ ⃗ w⟧, ⟦⃗ z⟧ and ⟦b⟧. Towards this, parties first execute secure dot-product on ⟦ ⃗ w⟧ and ⟦⃗ z⟧, followed by locally adding the result with ⟦b⟧. Then parties execute secure comparison protocol on the result obtained from Here we consider two classification algorithms, namely Logistic Regression and Linear SVM Classification. Similar to the case with Regression, both algorithms share the same computation from the server's perspective and thus we provide a single benchmark. The results appear in Table 7 .
Setting Work
Semi-honest Malicious
Offline Online Offline Online In this case, we observe that our protocol outperforms ABY3 in all the settings. This is mainly due to our secure comparison protocol (Section 4.1) where we improve upon both communication and rounds in the online phase. The effect of this improvement becomes more visible for applications where the secure comparison is used extensively. In Figure 14 , we provide below a comparison of online throughput (#queries/sec for LAN and #queries/min for WAN) against the number of features in the malicious setting. 
